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IS THE DOOR OPEN OR CLOSED?
EVALUATING THE FUTURE OF THE
FEDERAL MEDICAL PEER-REVIEW
PRIVILEGE
GHAZAL SHARIFI*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Francisco Pardo is a homosexual physician who worked as a
radiation oncologist for the General Hospital Corporation.1
Russell Adkins is an African-American physician who worked in
the surgery department of Houston Medical Center. 2 Like many
physicians, both men were subject to peer-review, and both were
subsequently released from their positions after several peer3
reviews of their performances.
Dr. Pardo filed a state discrimination lawsuit against his
employer. 4 Dr. Adkins filed a federal discrimination lawsuit
against his employer. 5 During the course of litigation, both men
In response, each of the
sought broad discovery requests.
defendants claimed that the materials Drs. Pardo and Adkins
sought were privileged. 6 In both cases, the trial courts recognized
the medical peer-review privilege. 7 Dr. Pardo ultimately lost on
* J.D., May 2009, The John Marshall Law School. The author thanks the
members of the The John Marshall Law Review, especially Michael Barry for
guiding her throughout the entire comment-writing process. The author also
thanks Dean Ralph Ruebner for his infinite wisdom and mentorship. Finally,
the author would like to express her love and gratitude to her parents and
Travis Kennedy for their continual encouragement and support.
1. Pardo v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., 841 N.E.2d 692, 694 (Mass. 2006).
2. Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
3. Pardo,841 N.E.2d at 697-98; Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1326-27.
4. Pardo, 841 N.E.2d at 696. Pardo claimed that "he was concerned that
he was not being 'treated appropriately' and that he was planning to pursue
his rights 'as a gay male in the workplace."' Id. at 698.
5. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1326. Dr. Adkins filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1985, claiming that his employer "discriminated against him on racial
grounds in their implementation and utilization of [the] peer review and
physician disciplinary process." Id.
6. Pardo,841 N.E.2d at 698; Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1327.
Dr. Pardo
7. Pardo, 841 N.E.2d at 698; Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1327.
specifically sought "all documents relating to patient care deficiencies by other
members of the [department] ... [dating] from 1986 to the present." Pardo,
841 N.E.2d at 699. Dr. Pardo joined the radiation oncology department in
1986, and was therefore seeking documents spanning the course of his
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appeal, as the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the
materials were privileged under Massachusetts' law. 8 In contrast,
Dr. Adkins prevailed on appeal, where the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the medical peer-review privilege does not
apply to federal discrimination cases.9 These are two similar
cases, with similar discovery requests, with one important
distinction: their outcomes were the exact opposite.
In Part II, this Comment will assess the Seventh, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals' refusal to recognize the
medical peer-review privilege.
Part III will evaluate the
background of medical peer-review privilege through the context of
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (hereinafter
"HCQIA"), Federal Rule of Evidence 501, and federal and state
case law. In Part IV, this Comment will analyze whether the
Seventh, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have failed to follow the
confines of Rule 501, Supreme Court precedent, and the HCQIA in
their decisions not to recognize federal medical peer-review
privilege. Part IV will also evaluate the impact of such cases on
litigation surrounding peer-review, as well as the overall impact
on the peer-review process itself. In Part V, this Comment will
discuss whether the Seventh, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuit
decisions concerning federal peer-review privilege were correctly
decided and whether they will have any impact on medical
malpractice litigation, as well as physician candidness in the peerreview process. Finally, this Comment will propose various policy
changes as well as offer guidelines that courts may follow in
assessing the medical peer-review privilege.

employment. Id. at 695. The hospital's reasons for Dr. Pardo's discharge were
due to his alleged deficiencies in "clinical teaching and patient care activities."
Id. at 696.
Dr. Adkins sought "documents relating to peer review of all physicians
at the hospital during the seven years that [he] was a member of the hospital
staff." Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1327 (emphasis in original). The Houston Medical
Center claimed that Dr. Adkins' dismissal was a result of "repeatedly
experiencing problems with availability for call, timely completion of medical
records and failure to follow hospital protocol on patient admission." Id. at
1326.
8. Pardo, 841 N.E.2d at 704. The court discussed balancing the public
policy considerations against discrimination and eradicating physician
incompetency, concluding, "the legislature did not provide a blanket exception
to the medical peer review privilege where there is a claim that a physician's
actions are motivated by discriminatory animus." Id. at 703.
9. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1331. The court determined that state statutes
establishing the medical peer-review privilege address different policy
concerns (i.e. medical malpractice lawsuits). Id. at 1330. The court identified
a "strong evidentiary benefit" in not recognizing of the medical peer-review
privilege in federal discrimination cases. Id.
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II. FRAMEWORK FOR THE MEDICAL PEER-REVIEW PRIVILEGE
Currently, all fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia,
have created an evidentiary privilege for medical peer-review
information.
Based on policy considerations, this privilege
protects such information from discovery during litigation. 10
These state privileges seek to protect physicians engaged in

10. George Newton II, Maintainingthe Balance:Reconciling the Social and
Judicial Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723, 723-24
(2001); see Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1330 (noting that all fifty states and the
District of Columbia recognize the medical peer review privilege); Brief for the
Georgia
Hospital
Association
as
Amicus
Curiae
Supporting
Defendant/Appellees at 36, Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007)
(06-13107-GG) (discussing how Georgia and every other state has passed
legislation protecting peer-reviewed materials); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-21-8
(West 2008) ("Written reports, records, correspondence, and materials
concerning the accreditation or quality assurance or similar function of any
hospital, clinic, or medical staff... shall be held in confidence and shall not be
subject to discovery or introduction in evidence in any civil action against a
health care professional or institution arising out of matters which are the
subject of evaluation and review for accreditation, quality assurance and
similar functions."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-445.01 (West 2008) ("All
proceedings, records and materials prepared in connection with [peer]
reviews ...including all peer reviews of individual health care providers
practicing in and applying to practice in hospitals or outpatient surgical
centers and the records of such reviews, are confidential and are not subject to
discovery."); CAL EVID. CODE § 1157(a) (West 2008) ("Neither the proceedings
nor the records of organized. . . peer review bod[ies], or medical or dental
review [bodies] ... shall be subject to discovery."); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a17b(d) (West 2008) ("The proceedings of a medical review committee
conducting a peer review shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into
evidence in any civil action for or against a health care provider arising out of
the matters which are subject to evaluation and review by such
committee .. "); D.C. CODE § 44-805(a)(1) (West 2008) ("The files, records,
findings, opinions, recommendations, evaluations, and reports of a peer review
body, information provided to or obtained by a peer review body, the identity
of persons providing information to a peer review body ... shall be confidential
and shall be neither discoverable nor admissible into evidence in any civil,
criminal, legislative, or administrative proceeding."); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7133(a) (West 2008) ("Except in proceedings alleging violation of this article,
the proceedings and records of a review organization shall be held in
confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence
in any civil action .. "); IND. CODE § 34-30-15-2 (West 2008) ("Except as
otherwise provided in this chapter, a person who attends a peer review
committee proceeding shall not be permitted or required to disclose:(1) any
information acquired in connection with or in the course of a proceeding;
(2) any opinion, recommendation, or evaluation of the committee; or (3) any
opinion, recommendation, or evaluation of any committee member."); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-21.22(e)(f) (West 2008) ("No person participating in good faith
in the peer review or impaired physician or impaired physician assistant
programs of this section shall be required in a civil case to disclose any
information acquired or opinions, recommendations, or evaluations acquired
or developed solely in the course of participating in any agreements pursuant
to this section.").
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medical peer-review from having peer-review information used
against them in medical malpractice litigation and litigation
surrounding libel or slander. The state privileges also seek to
encourage physician candidness by removing the fear of
litigation.11
Federal privileges, as opposed to state privileges, are shaped
largely by evidentiary rules. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26
establishes that parties cannot have access to privileged
information during the course of litigation. 12 Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 defines the framework within which courts can
recognize these evidentiary privileges. 13 In attempts to apply
federal evidentiary rules, courts have created controversy
surrounding the issue of the federal medical peer-review privilege.
In 1981, the Seventh Circuit was the first circuit court of appeals
to hold that medical peer-review privileges do not extend to federal
cases.1 4 In 2001, the Fourth Circuit followed suit, holding that the
privilege does not apply in federal discrimination cases because
the probative value of the materials outweigh the policy
considerations for maintaining the privilege. 15 Just recently, in
Adkins v. Christie, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits in concluding that the state privilege does not

11. See Amicus Brief for Defendant/Appellees, supra note 10, at 36;
(discussing how the peer review privilege protects health care personnel from
litigation); Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1328 (discussing how loss of the privilege could
chill evaluator candidness in the peer review process); Virmani v. Novant
Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing how such policy
considerations may be hampered without protection from a federal recognition
of the medical peer-review privilege).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. 26(a)(1) states, "Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense." Id. at (a)(1).
13. FED. R. EVID. 501. Rule 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of
a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id. The rule establishes that the courts can determine the scope of evidentiary
privileges through the federal common law and through their reason and
experience. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996). However, the rule does
establish that in civil actions applying state law (i.e. in diversity actions), the
state's laws governing privilege apply to the case. Id.
14. Mem'l. Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1063-64
(7th Cir. 1981).
15. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 293.
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extend to federal court. 16 This series of cases has prompted
questions surrounding the materials that are discoverable, the
impact of decisions to exclude or include certain materials, and the
17
potential solutions to the problems that arise.
A. Behind Closed Doors:Peer-Review Defined
1. Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA)
The HCQIA defines the boundaries of the medical peer-review
privilege and the framework for the immunities permitted under
it.18
Congress passed the HCQIA seeking to improve quality
assurance within the medical community, 19 and also to provide
incentives and protection so as to increase physician
participation. 20 The HCQIA provides immunity for individuals
within or connected to the "professional review body." 21 While the
HCQJA governs states, 22 it does not restrict state governments
from passing legislation providing further protections or
23
limitations on the immunity of health care professionals.

16. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1330.
17. See Alyson Palmer, 11th Circuit: Interests in Federal Civil Rights Cases
Trump Hospitals' Shield Against Disclosure, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.
(June
19,
2007).
available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?
id=1182194747374# (discussing the uncertainty of how far courts will allow
discovery relating to medical peer-reviewed materials).
18. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1110111115 (1986). Congress stated the purpose of the HCQIA as follows: "[t] here is
a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from
State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous
damaging or incompetent performance.
This nationwide problem can be
remedied through effective professional peer review." Id. § 11101.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1).
20. Id. § 11101(5).
21. Id. § 11111(a). The HCQIA defines "professional review body" as: "a
health care entity and the governing body or any committee of a health care
entity which conducts professional review activity, and includes any
committee of the medical staff of such an entity when assisting the governing
body in a professional review activity." Id. § 11151(11). The protections are
extended to "(A) the professional review body [itself], (B) any person acting as
a member or staff to the body, (C) any person under a contract or other formal
agreement with the body, and (D) any person who participate with or assists
the body with respect to the action." Id. § 11111(1).
22. Id. § 11111(a).
Section 11111(a) states, "[A] professional review
action ... of a professional review body... shall not be liable in damages
under any law of the United States or of any State (or political subdivision
thereof) with respect to the action." Id.
23. Id. § 11115(d).
Section 11115(d) states, "Treatment of patient
malpractice claims. Nothing in this title ...shall be construed as affecting in
any manner the rights and remedies afforded patients under any provision of
Federal or State law to seek redress for any harm or injury suffered as a result
of negligent treatment or care by any physician, health care practitioner, or
health care entity, or as limiting any defenses or immunities available to any
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However, the act explicitly states that the immunities and
protections provided by the HCQIA do not apply to civil rights
24
litigation.
Cases interpreting the HCQIA have uniformly applied the
protections and exceptions to individuals involved in peer-review.
For example, in Austin v. McNamara,25 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the defendants, whom had participated in the
peer-review process of the plaintiff, were immune from a federal
anti-trust action under the HCQIA. 26 In contrast, in Jeung v.
McKrow, 27 the Eastern District of Michigan held that the
defendants were not immune under the HCQIA from the plaintiffs
28
civil rights suit.
However, federal courts have had differing interpretations on
whether the HCQIA protects peer-reviewed information from
discovery. 29 Some federal courts have held that the HCQIA does
not bar discovery of peer-review materials, whereas others hold
physician, health care practitioner, or health care entity." Id.
24. Id. § 11111(a)(D). Section 11111(a)(D) does not extend the liability
protections for those participating in medical peer-review where the litigation
pertains to "damages ...relating to the civil rights of any person, or persons."
Id.
25. 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992).
26. Id. In Austin, the plaintiff contended that the defendant physicians
were conspiring against him and attempting to shut down his neurosurgery
practice by ending his staff privileges at the hospital where he worked. Id. at
731-32.
After several complaints by the nursing staff, the defendant
physicians conducted a series of peer-review evaluations of the plaintiff. Id. at
731. Ultimately, after multiple hearings, the hospital suspended the plaintiffs
privileges, which were subsequently reinstated by a reviewing council. Id. at
732. The Ninth Circuit held that the requirements of the HCQIA were met,
and that suspension of Austin's privileges were within the boundaries of
section 11111(a). Id. at 737. Likewise, in Rogers v. Columbia, the Western
District of Louisiana held that the physician defendants engaged in peerreview of the plaintiff were immune from a federal antitrust and state
defamation lawsuit under the HCQIA. 971 F. Supp. 229, 237 (W.D. La. 1997).
Similar to the facts in Austin, the plaintiff physician in Rogers was a bariatric
surgeon who had his bariatric surgery privileges revoked for a year after peerHe claimed that the
review by the defendant physicians. Id. at 231.
defendants were conspiring against him and defaming him. Id. The court
concluded that the defendants were immune under 42 U.S.C. §11111(a). Id. at
237.
27. 264 F. Supp. 2d 557 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
28. Id. at 572-73. The plaintiff was a physician of Korean descent alleging
discrimination under section 1981 by the hospital administrator, the
defendant. Id. at 568. After several conflicts with the defendant and peerreviews of his performance, the plaintiffs surgery privileges were suspended.
Id. at 561-63. The defendant sought to assert qualified immunity under the
HCQIA. Id. at 567-68. After the court established that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case under section 1981, it determined that the
HCQIA does not apply to civil rights claims. Id. at 561, 572.
29. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (describing what individuals
are considered connected to a peer-review body).
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30

2. FederalRule of Evidence 501
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "FRCP") 26
governs the discovery process in federal courts. 31 FRCP 26 places
limitations on access to privileged information; 32 however, it does
not explain what information is or is not privileged. 33 Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 (hereinafter "Rule 501") governs the use of
privilege in federal litigation. 4 The rule does not establish brightline principles on what material is considered privileged, but
rather directs the courts to apply the common law and use "reason
and experience" in recognizing privileges. 35 The rule also directs
courts to apply state privilege laws in civil cases where state laws
36
govern an element of a claim or a defense.
In enacting Rule 501, Congress had concerns on whether the
37
rule would create confusion as to when state law would apply,
38
leading to potential issues with forum shopping.
The House of

30. Compare Cohn v. Wilkes Gen. Hosp., 127 F.R.D. 117, 121 (W.D. N.C.
1989) (holding that in addition to state law, the HCQIA privileges the peerreviewed materials requested by the physician plaintiff), with Atteberry v.
Longmont United Hosp. 221 F.R.D. 644, 647-48 (D.C. Colo. 2004) (holding that
there is no federal medical peer-review privilege and that the state privilege
does not apply, therefore granting plaintiffs discovery request of peerreviewed materials for her medical malpractice lawsuit) and Mattice v. Mem'l
Hosp. of S. Bend, 203 F.R.D. 381, 386-87 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (concluding that the
HCQIA does not privilege peer-review materials and are therefore
discoverable).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 26; see supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing
how 26(a)(1) restricts a party's access to privileged information).
32. Id.
33. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1), 26(b)(1), 26(b)(5), 26(f) (establishing
boundaries for what can be done with privileged material prior to and at trial).
But the rule does not shed light as to what is considered privileged. Id.
34. FED. R. EVID. 501.
35. Id. Rule 501 states in relevant part,
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
Id.
36. Id.
Rule 501 describes application of state law as follows: "[I]n civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with State law." Id.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 7082 (1973); S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 7059
(1973) (detailing the House of Representatives and Senate committee
discussions on various concerns raised by enacting Rule 501).
38. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 7082.
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Representatives determined that where there is no federal
question or federal interest in the case, state law should prevail. 39
The Senate was more troubled by the state-federal dichotomy in
Rule 501. 4 0 It asserted that such a distinction could create future

litigation surrounding what is considered an element of a claim or
defense. 41 Furthermore, the Senate was concerned with the
potential impact on mixed issues where both federal and state law
may apply. 42 The Senate did note, however, that where there are
mixed issues creating a question of whether to apply state
privilege laws, federal courts should favor admitting the evidence
43
in question.
While never reaching the issue of medical peer-review
privilege, the Supreme Court has provided guidance on evaluating
federal privileges. In Jaffee v. Redmond,44 the Court detailed
several factors to assess in determining whether a privilege should
be recognized. 45 Initially, the Court discussed the "common law"
39. Id. The committee acknowledged that by adding the state law provision
"[u]nder which the federal courts are bound to apply the State's privilege law
in actions founded upon a State-created right or defense[,] removes the
incentive to 'shop."' Id.
40. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 7059 (discussing the Senate's conflict over
whether the addition of the state provision to Rule 501 will create further
problems).
41. Id. The committee comments discussing the 'element of a claim or
defense' provision of the Rule states as follows:
The question of what is an element of a claim or defense is likely to
engender considerable litigation. If the matter in question constitutes
an element of a claim, State law supplies the privilege rule; whereas if it
is a mere item of proof with respect to a claim, then, even though State
law might supply the rule of decision, Federal law on the privilege would
apply.
Id.
42. Id. The Senate committee notes discuss that two different aspects of
privilege law would potentially apply in a situation where both federal and
state claims or defenses would arise in a case brought in federal court. Id.
The committee notes illustrated this point by noting that such a situation
could arise in a federal antitrust case combined with a state unfair
competition action. Id. The notes state that in such situations, "[i]t may even
develop that the same witness-testimony might be relevant on both counts and
privileged as to one but not the other." Id.
43. Id. On evaluating a potential conflict in the application of state
privilege laws or the guidance by Rule 501 of using reason and experience, the
Senate committee notes state as follows: "If the rule proposed here results in
two conflicting bodies of privilege law applying to the same piece of evidence in
the same case, it is contemplated that the rule favoring reception of the
evidence should be applied." Id.
44. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
45. Id. at 10-15. The issue in Jaffee was whether there should be a federal
evidentiary "privilege protecting confidential communications between a
psychotherapist and her patient." Id. at 9-10. After running through a
number of factors, the Court concluded that the privilege promotes policy
interests that outweigh the probative value of the evidence. Id. at 18.
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clause of Rule 501, holding that the common law dictates a
"primary assumption" that all evidence is admissible, and "any
46
exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional."
In establishing the factors to be followed in Rule 501 analysis,
the Court first discussed whether the privilege would further the
needs of the public good. 47 However, the Court did not provide
much explanation in assessing this factor. 48 The second factor the
Court discussed was the need to assess whether the privilege is
"rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust."49 In
applying the principle, the Court evaluated whether the privilege
would benefit private interests by encouraging more honest
communications, and whether the privilege would serve the public
interest as well. 50 Third, after weighing private and public
interests, the Court examined whether there is consensus amongst
the states in recognizing the privilege.51 The Court emphasized
the importance of state-recognized privileges by stating, "the
policy decisions of the States bear on the question [of] whether
federal courts should recognize a new privilege," determining that
''consensus among the States indicates that 'reason and
experience' support recognition of the privilege." 52 Finally, the
Court weighed all of the above factors against the evidentiary

46. Id. at 9. The Court determined that the federal common law concerning
evidentiary privileges makes a "primary assumption that there is a general
duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions
which may exist are distinctly exceptional." Id. The Seventh Circuit, in Ryan
v. Comm'r, emphasized the importance of disclosure, where the court stated,
"[P]rivileges must be narrowly construed because they block the judicial factfinding function." 568 F.2d. 531, 542 (7th Cir. 1977).
47. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9.
48. Id. The Court only describes that evidentiary privileges may be
justified "by a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Id. The Court ceased
further discussion on this factor only stating that they thought it did apply in
the case of the psychotherapist context. Id. at 10. Due to the lack of analysis,
this may be the overarching consideration when evaluating all other factors
weighing the probative and policy values of recognizing privilege.
49. Id. at 10.
50. Id. at 10-12. When applying this principle to the psychotherapistpatient relationship, the Court concluded that the privilege serves a private
interest by encouraging more honest communications between a patient and
psychotherapist, which is necessary for successful treatment of the patient.
Id. at 10. Furthermore, the Court asserted that the privilege "serves the
public interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for
individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem." Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 12.
52. Id. at 13. The Court continued by discussing that state assurances of
confidentiality and privilege would be meaningless if the individual realizes
that those assurances do not extend to federal courts, stating that, "[d]enial of
the federal privilege would ... frustrate the purposes of the state legislation
that was enacted to foster these confidential communications." Id. at 13.
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benefit in denying the privilege. 53 If the above factors countervail
the "truth-seeking function" of not recognizing the privilege, then
54
the privilege may be recognized.
3. State Recognition of the Medical Peer-Review Privilege
All fifty states have enacted into law a variation of the
medical peer-review privilege. 55 Unlike the HCQIA,56 most states
not only extend immunity to individuals involved in the peerreview process, but also provide protection for the materials used
57
in the peer-review process.
Professor Susan Scheutzow, a leading scholar on health law,58
analyzed a study conducted by the University of Wisconsin in
conjunction
with
the
Health
Resources
and
Services
Administration regarding state medical peer-review processes. 59
Dr. Scheutzow stated:
State laws generally grant protection in one or more of three ways:
(1) providing peer review participants immunity from lawsuits for
participating in the process; (2) making peer review information
privileged from discovery and admission in court; and (3) requiring
that the participants in the process keep information regarding the
60
process and its findings confidential.

53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. As to the specific facts of Jaffee, the Court found that absent a
privilege allowing for more frank and honest communication between a
psychotherapist and his or her patient, "much of the desirable evidence to
which litigants ...seek access ... is unlikely to come into being." Id.
55. See Amicus Brief for Defendant/Appellees, supra note 10 and
accompanying text (noting that all states have enacted laws protecting peerreview privileges and citing to various state laws to exemplify similarities and
distinctions).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11115; see supra note 24 and accompanying text
(noting that the text of section 11111(a) of the HCQIA extends immunity to
those involved in the peer-review process).
57. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (illustrating various state
statutes, where most grant protections for materials within the peer-review
process). All of the state statutes referenced in note 10 have protections for
documentations, proceedings, and materials produced within peer-review
committees.
58. Dr. Scheutzow is the Vice-President and Chief Legal Officer
of Southwest General Health Center in Ohio. She has served as counsel for
health organizations and physicians for over 20 years. Leading Lawyers:
Profiles, INSIDE BUS., Dec. 1, 2001, Vol. 3, No. 12, at 82. Dr. Scheutzow also
serves as an adjunct professor of law and teaching and writing extensively on
health-law related issues. Id.
59. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No
Benefit - Is It Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. AND MED. 7 (1999). In her
article, Dr. Scheutzow assessed the effectiveness of peer-review protections.
Id. She argued that despite so many protections, peer-review statutes do not
encourage peer-review, and therefore should be reformed. Id. at 8-9.
60. Id. at 9.
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Dr. Scheutzow also drew distinctions between state laws that
protect confidentiality and those that enable privileges, noting
that privilege extends to the discoverability and admissibility of
evidence to judicial proceedings, whereas confidentiality applies to
release of the peer-reviewed information to third parties outside of
judicial actions. 61 She noted that physicians are still reluctant to
participate in peer-review where they have immunity from civil
lawsuits regarding their participation alone, and not their
proceedings. 62
Therefore, "[t]o create an environ-ment that
encourages physicians to participate in peer review, states have
63
adopted privileges for peer review proceedings."
The scope of state laws governing the discoverability of peerreviewed information has also been categorized through states'
policy priorities. 64 While some states proscribe an "outer limits"
approach affording extensive privilege protections, 65 others adhere
to a "middle of the road" approach to balance the need for
66
disclosure against the benefits of maintaining the privilege. Still
others recognize the privilege, but give more weight to disclosing
the information. 67 The underlying policy considerations for state
enactment of peer-review protections lie in the need to encourage
physician participation in the peer-review process without the fear
of "find[ing] themselves under attack for defamation and other
68
actions."
B. Room for Opening: The Current State of the FederalMedical
Peer-Review Privilege
As it currently stands, there is no established federal medical
peer-review privilege. 69 There have been three federal circuit

61. Id. at 17. Despite the distinction, it appears that most states are
incorporating both confidentiality and privilege, as is exemplified by the
sample statutes given in the accompanying text supra note 10.
62. Id. at 18.
63. Id.
64. Christina A. Graham, Hide and Seek: Discovery In The Context of The
State and FederalPeer Review Privileges, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 111, 125 (2000).
65. Id.
These states prioritize the policy benefits of privileging peerreviewed information over the probative value of disclosing such information.

Id.
66. Id. at 131.
67. Id. at 135. The states that adhere to this approach have statutory
protections for peer-reviewed information. Id. However, courts are not quick
to invoke the privilege. See id. at 136-38 (discussing cases from Illinois and
Rhode Island, where the courts declined to recognize the privilege despite
statutory protections).
68. Scheutzow, supra note 59, at 17.
69. No federal circuit court of appeals has recognized a federal medical
peer-review privilege. The Supreme Court has also been silent on the issue.
See Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys., 210 F.R.D. 597, 601 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (noting
that there is a lack of Supreme Court precedent on the issue of federal medical
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courts that have addressed the issue: the Seventh, the Fourth, and
recently the Eleventh. 70 However, the distinctions between the
federal trend of nonrecognition of the privilege and the state
trends towards peer-review protections lead to uncertainty of the
future of the federal medical peer-review privilege in the court
71
system.
The Supreme Court has not determined whether there is a
federal medical peer-review privilege nor is there a circuit split
amongst the federal courts of appeals. 72 The Court, however, has
touched on academic peer-review privileges in University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC,73 where it held that there is no privilege
for academic peer-review materials because such a privilege "lacks
constitutional foundation [and] [h]as no ...historical or statutory
basis."

74

The first federal circuit court of appeals to evaluate the
medical peer-review privilege was the Seventh Circuit in McHenry
County v. Shadur.75 The physician plaintiff in Shadur alleged
that a "disciplinary proceeding against him before the Hospital's
Board of Directors was in reality a sham as a means of
implementing the alleged restraint of trade." 76 During discovery,
he sought documentation related to the proceedings, but the
hospital then claimed that the materials were privileged. 77 The
peer-review privileges).
70. McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981); Virmani v.
Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001); Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d
1324.
71. Palmer, supra note 17.
72. See id. (discussing how the defendants in Adkins may seek further
review by the Supreme Court even though there is not a circuit court split).
73. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
74. Id. at 195. In this case, the plaintiff was a professor that had been
denied tenure at University of Pennsylvania. Id. at 184-85 She alleged that
her supervisor had made sexual advances towards her, and upon being
rejected, he wrote negative reports of her for the University Personnel
Committee, who ultimately made tenure decisions. Id. at 85. The EEOC took
the plaintiffs case and in seeking to discover some materials from the peerreview committee (Personnel Committee), the University invoked a privilege.
Id. at 186. The Supreme Court refused to fashion a new peer-review privilege
claiming that the probative value of the evidence in a discrimination claim
outweighs the policy underpinnings of invoking such a privilege. Id. at 189.
75. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058.
76. Id. at 1060. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant physicians
continually utilized the peer-review function to exclude him from the medical
staff at the hospital where he was employed. Id. at 1059-60.
77. Id.
Specifically, the plaintiff sought production of "[a]ll documents
relating to proceedings instituted by the Hospital against physicians who had
This
applied for or were granted admission to its medical staff." Id.
information was covered under the Illinois Medical Studies Act making it a
The court
Class A misdemeanor for disclosure of such information. Id.
ultimately determined that the criminal sanctions do not extend to discovery
within federal proceedings, and that the dilemma between state and federal
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Seventh Circuit conducted a Rule 501 analysis, 78 and determined
that the need for full disclosure was especially necessary in that
case to advance the interest of the "[olpen and fair competition
embodied in the Sherman Act." 79 Finally, the court rejected
application of the state law and its policy foundations of promoting
80
peer-review without the fear of medical malpractice litigation.
The court held that the case at hand arose out of the peer-review
proceedings, thus increasing the necessity to disclose such
information, where nondisclosure may foreclose the lawsuit to
begin with.8 '
Twenty years after Shadur, the Fourth Circuit addressed the
issue of federal medical peer-review privilege in Virmani v. Novant
Healthcare Inc.s2 In Virmani, the physician plaintiff alleged that
his termination arose out of peer-review proceedings, which were
83
performed discriminatorily against his race and national origin.
The plaintiff sought discovery of peer-review proceedings, and the
defendants invoked peer-review privilege.8 4 Like Shadur, the
Virmani court applied Rule 501 analysis rejecting the defendant's
reliance on Jaffee.8 5 Rather the court relied on University of
6
Agreeing with that decision, the Fourth
Pennsylvaniav. EEOC.8
law is "illusory in light of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution." Id. at 1063-64.
78. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (discussing court analysis of
recognizing new privileges under Rule 501, specifically looking at probative
value of the evidence versus countervailing policy considerations).
79. Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1062. The court noted that if the plaintiff were to
prove his case, then it would also protect his right to practice medicine in the
area. Id.
80. Id. The court observed that the purpose of the Illinois Medical Studies
Act was to promote candidness in hospital peer-review committees. Id. It
discussed the Act's aims at protecting such information from discovery in
cases such as medical malpractice cases, where the underlying claim does not
arise out of the proceedings but rather some independent action. Id.
81. Id. at 1062-63.
82. 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001).
83. Id. at 285-86. Dr. Virmani had undergone a series of peer-review
evaluations after he punctured the iliac artery of a patient during a procedure.
Id.
84. Id. at 286. Specifically, Dr. Virmani "sought to obtain []all peer review
records related to all reviews of physicians for any reason, during the twenty
years preceding his request." Id.
85. Id. at 288. The court noted that the factual circumstances surrounding
Jaffee were significantly different from those of Virmani. Id. The court did
acknowledge the importance of the medical peer-review process and the policy
underpinnings stressing the importance of a privilege. Id. at 289. However,
the court rejected the defendant's reliance on Jaffee in establishing that such
policy considerations outweighed the probative value of disclosing the peerreview materials. Id. at 289-90. The court noted, "The evidence that Virmani
[sought] E is not evidence in the form of a 'smoking gun,' but rather, evidence
of disparate treatment on the basis of impermissible factors." Id. at 289.
86. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
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Circuit held that in a discrimination suit, "costs associated with
discrimination outweighed the costs that would ensue from the
87
disclosure of peer review materials."
The most recent decision on the federal medical peer-review
privilege was that of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Adkins v. Christie.8 8 The factual circumstances of the case are
similar to those of Virmani.8 9 In Adkins, the plaintiff physician
asserted a federal discrimination claim against his employer. 90 He
was subsequently denied discovery of peer-reviewed materials
because the hospital claimed, and the district court agreed, that
such materials were privileged. 91 In evaluating the peer-review
privilege, after applying Rule 501 analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
relied heavily on Virmani, ultimately "[d]eclining to recognize
[that] a medical peer review privilege.

. .

provides a strong

evidentiary benefit." 92 In following the above trends of the circuit
courts, many federal district courts have also held that there is no
93
medical peer-review privilege.
In urging the recognition of the privilege, defendant

87. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 289. The court applied University of Pennsylvania
v. EEOC by agreeing that the "peer review materials... [were] especially
relevant because the discrimination charge arose from the peer review
proceedings themselves." Id.
88. 488 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007); see discussion supra Part I (discussing
the factual circumstances of Adkins and the specific findings of the Court).
89. 259 F.3d 284.
90. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1326-27.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1330. The court identified the importance of evaluating state
policy considerations, however (quoting Virmani), it determined, "'there is no
evidence that state legislatures considered the potential impact on
discrimination cases of a privilege for medical peer review proceedings."' Id.
93. See Nilavar, 210 F.R.D. at 601, 609 (holding that because of the lack of
Supreme Court precedent, guidance by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
combined with other circuits' authority and its own Rule 501 analysis, a
federal medical peer-review privilege does not exist, and therefore, does not
apply to the antitrust claim asserted by the plaintiff); In Re Admin. Subpoena
Blue Cross Blue Shield, 400 F. Supp. 2d 386, 390-93 (D.C. Mass. 2005)
(holding that the probative value of the medical peer-reviewed evidence
outweighs policy considerations used to establish the State privilege,
therefore, there is no federal medical peer-review privilege); Weiss v. County
of Chester, 231 F.R.D. 202, 206 (E.D. Penn. 2005) (noting that despite the
importance of the interests reflected in the state privilege, the probative value
of the evidence outweighs, therefore, there is no federal medical peer-review
privilege); Braswell v. Haywood Reg'l Med. Ctr., 352 F. Supp. 2d 639, 650
(W.D.N.C. 2005) (holding that after Virmani, a federal medical peer-review
privilege does not apply to the Fourth Circuit); United States v. United Mem'l
Hosp., No. 1:01-CR-238, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4962 at *8-9 (W.D. Mich. 2002)
(concluding that no medical peer-review privilege exists, especially in the
context of a federal prosecution); Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan., 220 F.R.D. 633, 645
(D. Kan. 2004) (holding that the probative value of peer-reviewed information
in an action of discrimination outweighs the policy implications of disclosure).
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hospitals raised policy concerns that without the protection of a
privilege, physicians would not be candid in the peer-review
process, and that physicians would resist participation fearing
litigation surrounding medical malpractice, libel, slander, and
other civil actions. 94 However, despite these concerns, the federal
courts have thus far refused to recognize the privilege, opening the
door to questions surrounding what will happen to the peer-review
95
process if such information is discoverable.
III. DIRECTION OF THE FEDERAL MEDICAL
PEER-REVIEW PRIVILEGE

Contrary to state trends, the Seventh, Fourth, and Eleventh
Circuits declined to recognize the peer-review privilege. 96 The
courts' reasoning raises questions as to whether the courts
operated within the boundaries of Rule 501, Court precedent, as
Furthermore,
well as within the confines of the HCQIA.97
proponents of the privilege are concerned that such a trend in
federal courts towards refusal to recognize the peer-review
privilege will lead to a variety of negative consequences in the
realm of litigation and against the role of effective peer-review. 98

94. See Amicus Brief for Defendant/Appellees, supra note 10; Adkins, 488
F.3d at 1328; Virmani, 259 F.3d at 290 (discussing defendant's arguments on
the public policy underpinnings of recognizing a federal medical peer review
privilege).
95. See Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1063-64; Virmani, 259 F.3d at 293; and Adkins,
488 F.3d at 1329-30 (recognizing that the policy considerations surrounding
state-recognized privileges do not outweigh evidentiary benefits of disclosing
peer-reviewed materials).
96. See Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1061 (discussing how the law of the state
where the action arose must not be ignored by federal courts in balancing the
policy considerations of nondisclosure versus the probative value of the
information); Virmani, 259 F.3d at 290 (noting that all fifty states as well as
the District of Columbia recognize a medical peer-review privilege); Adkins,
488 F.3d at 1330 (acknowledging that the medical peer-review privilege is
recognized by all fifty states and the District of Columbia).
97. See Teresa L. Salamon, When Revoking Privilege Leads to Invoking
Privilege: Whether There is a Need to Recognize a Clearly Defined Medical Peer
Review Privilege in Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 47 VILL. L. REV. 643, 670
(2002) (determining that the Virmani court failed to follow state trends and
precedent).
98. See Alissa Marie Bassler, Federal Law Should Keep Pace with States
and Recognize a Medical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 689, 711-12
(2003) (proposing that federal courts recognize the medical peer-review
privilege to maintain candid and honest evaluations in the peer-review
process, and to reduce forum shopping between state and federal courts
caused by the disparity between state recognition of the privilege and the
federal nonrecognition); Salamon, supra note 97, at 673-74 (noting that after
decisions such as Virmani, the peer-review privilege will be ineffective, thus
quashing the benefits of the peer-review process of reducing the detrimental
impact of incompetent physicians).
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A.

Within the Confines: Whether the Seventh, Fourthand
Eleventh Circuits Stayed Within the
Boundariesof Rule 501, Court Precedent, and the HCQL4

In declining to recognize the medical peer-review privilege,
the Seventh, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have
potentially stepped outside of the boundaries of Rule 501 by
ignoring the principles of the federal "common law" and the
"reason and experience" standards in coming to decisions. 99
Furthermore, the appellate courts may have strayed from Court
precedent in evaluating the probative value of disclosure and the
policy considerations of maintaining the privilege.1 00
1. Rule 501
Rule 501 requires that courts use "reason and experience" as
well as the guidance of the federal "common law" in coming to
determinations about whether a federal evidentiary privilege
should be invoked.10 ' The language of Rule 501 proscribes that
where state law governs, "[p]rivileges shall be determined in
accordance" with that state's law. 102 Furthermore, when enacting
Rule 501, the House Judiciary Committee had some apprehension
in not applying federal privilege standards surrounding scenarios
where there is no element of a "claim or defense" grounded in
federal law. 10 3 Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins all arose under
federal law. 104 Therefore, the appellate courts did not violate the
99. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that courts should determine whether
privileges exist by the guidance of the "common law" and in light of their
"reason and experience").
100. See Salamon, supra note 97, at 670 (discussing that the Virmani court
did not follow Jaffee in assessing the medical peer-review privilege).
101. FED. R. EVID. 501.
102. Id. The rule states in pertinent part as follows: "[H]owever, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with State law." Id.
103. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 1082. The report stated:
[The Proviso on the Court's proposed privilege rule] require[s] the
application of State privilege law in civil actions and proceedings
governed by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a result in
accord with current federal court decisions ... The rationale underlying
the proviso is that federal law should not supersede that of the States in
substantive areas such as privilege absent a compelling reason. The
Committee believes that in civil cases in the federal courts where an
element of a claim or defense is not grounded upon a federal question,
there is no federal interest strong enough to justify departure from State
policy.
Id.
104. See Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1061 (noting that the plaintiffs claim arose
under the Sherman Act); Virmani, 259 F.3d at 285-86 (identifying that the
plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985); Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1326
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language and spirit of Rule 501 in this respect.
The House Committee also had concern about forum
shopping.105
Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins did not limit
application of federal privilege standards to cases that arise solely
under federal law. Thus, while there may not be issues of forum
shopping in these particular circumstances, 106 or in situations
where there is a diversity action with the claim premised solely on
state law, issues may arise in situations where there are mixed
state and federal claims. Rule 501 and the House Committee
notes are silent on what privilege standards would apply in these
particular circumstances.
Uncertainty pertaining to mixed issues of state and federal
10 7
law was a primary concern for the Senate Judiciary Committee.
The Senate Committee was first concerned with potential
litigation surrounding what is considered "an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision. 1 0°
Second, it had reservations about potential difficulties arising in
cases where both federal and state laws govern.1 09 There was not
any conflict as to whether there was an 'element of a claim or
defense' governed by state law in Shadur, Virmani, or Adkins
because all of the claims arose out of federal law, 1 0 thus these
cases did not address the Senate's first concern. The Senate did
note that where there is a conflict of laws, the privilege standard
allowing disclosure should be favored.111 The Shadur, Virmani,
and Adkins courts all operated within the Senate Committee's
framework on how privileges should be applied. In assessing
whether to adopt a federal privilege, all three courts favored
(noting that the plaintiff brought his claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
1985).
105. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 7082-83. The report concluded that the Court's
proposed privilege rule would require federal courts to recognize certain
privileges; therefore, the committee felt that there might have been some
situations in civil actions that might have resulted in forum shopping if
certain states did not recognize those privileges and visa versa. Id. at 7089.
Thus, the House determined that under their proviso the "[f]ederal courts are
bound to apply the State's privilege law in actions founded upon a Statecreated right or defense removes the incentive to 'shop."' Id. at 7083.
106. Because Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins all had claims premised solely
under federal law, forum shopping was not a factor.
107. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, 7058-59 (noting apprehension surrounding
enacting the House version of Rule 501, which was subsequently accepted).
108. Id. at 7058; see also Senate Judiciary Committee notes, supra note 44
(noting that there may be situations where even if state law supplies the rule
of decision, federal law might afford the privilege).
109. See Senate Judiciary Committee notes supra note 44 (illustrating the
Senate Judiciary Committee's concerns with respect to cases that overlap
state and federal laws).
110. See supra note 105 (identifying the federal claims in the three
decisions).
111. See supra note 44 (revealing the Senate's favoring of disclosure).
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disclosure when having the option to adopt state medical-peer
review laws. 112 Given the above, the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins
courts did not operate outside the boundaries of the text of Rule
501, nor did they contravene the congressional intent on how the
rule should be applied.
2. Precedent
There is a question as to whether the Shadur, Virmani, and
Adkins courts adhered to Supreme Court precedent in coming to
their decisions. 113 The primary concern is that the Virmani and
Adkins courts incorrectly applied the "reason and experience"
analysis of Jaffee when coming to their decisions. 114 Shadur was
decided prior to Jaffee, and therefore, was not bound by the Jaffee
analysis. 115 However, Shadur acknowledged that it is important
to look at state trends when assessing whether to recognize a
privilege.1 16 Despite this acknowledgment, the Seventh Circuit
declined to extend the privilege emphasizing that federal
privileges should be "narrowly construed." 1 7 The court determined
that the materials were critical to the plaintiffs claim, unlike a
state malpractice action, where peer-reviewed materials "have
little impact on the plaintiffs ability to prove a meritorious
claim."

18

112. See Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1058 (declining to apply the state medical
peer-review privilege because the probative value of the evidence and the
policy reasons behind enforcing federal antitrust laws were too strong);
Virmani, 259 F.3d at 292 (declining to recognize the state medical peer-review
privilege because the need to acquire probative evidence in a discrimination
action outweighs the policy benefits of maintaining a privilege to promote
physician candidness); Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1330 (declining to apply state
medical peer-review privilege standards because the policy interest behind
rooting out invidious discrimination outweighs the interest in promoting
candidness).
113. See Salamon, supra note 97, at 670 (stating that Virmani failed to
follow precedent in looking at state trends under the Jaffee test).
114. See id. (arguing that the Virmani court failed to follow Jaffee reasoning
acknowledging that state trends should be evaluating when assessing a
privilege in federal court); Virmani, 269 F.3d at 290; Adkins, 488 F.3d at 132728 (noting that the Jaffee test requires that federal courts look at the
recognition of the privilege throughout states). While acknowledging that all
fifty states as well as the District of Columbia have recognized the privilege,
the court declined to recognize the privilege. Id.
115. Shadur was decided in 1981. Jaffee was decided in 1996.
116. The court recognized that it is important to consider state privileges in
federal privilege analysis because, "[a] strong policy of comity between state
and federal sovereignties impels federal courts to recognize state privileges
where this can be accomplished at no substantial cost to federal ... policy."
Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1061.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1062. This is where the Shadur court may have attempted to
draw the line between why the states recognize the peer-review privilege and
why it is not necessarily as critical in the anti-trust context. Id.
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The Virmani and Adkins courts did conduct a Jaffee analysis.
Both courts acknowledged that Jaffee requires that federal courts
assess state acknowledgment of the privilege. 119 The Virmani
court found that in enacting peer-review laws, state legislatures
were focusing on "different concerns" such as medical malpractice
lawsuits, and did not necessarily "[c]onsider a the potential impact
on discrimination cases."'120 Therefore, the Virmani court decided
to give state enactments little weight. 121 The Adkins court relied
directly on the Virmani analysis of state privilege legislation
stating, "the state statutes address different policy concerns when
they balance the need for candor ...and access to evidence in a
malpractice

suit ... a discrimination

claim like this one...

122
merit[s] a different analysis."'
Despite Jaffee's strong language suggesting that federal
courts should give great weight to state privileges statutes, the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits declined to recognize the peerreview privilege. 123 The distinction, however, may lie in the
factual circumstances of each respective case.
The policy
underpinnings in the state privilege statutes, which address the
need for a psychotherapist privilege were the same as those that
the Supreme Court acknowledged, 124 whereas both the Virmani

119. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291; Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1328; see Jaffee, 518 U.S.
at 12 (stating, "[p]olicy decisions of the States bear on the question whether
federal courts should recognize a new privilege ... state legislatures are fully
aware of the need to protect the integrity of the fact-finding function ...the
existence of a consensus among the States indicates that 'reason and
experience' supports recognition of the privilege"); see also Ralph Ruebner &
Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to HIPPA: A Foundation For A Federal
Physician-Patient Relationship, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 505, 544 (2004) (noting
that the Jaffee Court "acknowledged that primary source of modern privilege
law is legislative rather than judicial action," thus indicating a lack of federal
common law on privileges).
120. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291. The court evaluated policy decisions behind
the Georgia state peer-review privilege law, as well as other commentary on
the need to privilege peer-review information. Id. The court concluded that
state legislatures were focused on concerns of medical malpractice and
defamation lawsuits using peer-reviewed materials. Id. It determined that
there is no evidence that state legislatures even considered discrimination
arising out of the process, and therefore, decided to give little weight to the
state laws. Id.
121. Id.
122. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1330.
123. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291; Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1330; see Jaffee, 518 U.S.
at 12 ("The existence of a consensus among the States indicates that 'reason
and experience' supports recognition of the privilege.").
124. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9-11. The Court acknowledged that psychotherapistpatient privilege is "rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust."
Id. at 10. The Court determined that absent assured confidentiality, patients
would not be willing to talk freely and comfortably. Id.
The Court
acknowledged that state legislatures fostered these very principles when
invoking the privilege, stating, "[dienial of the federal privilege.., would
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and Adkins courts found that state peer-review legislation had
different underlying concerns 125 without necessarily evaluating the
A second possible
implications for discrimination actions.
explanation for the differential treatment of state privilege
statutes is that in Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins the claims arose
out of the peer-review process, whereas the same situation does
not apply in the context of a psychotherapist privilege.' 26 While
the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins courts did ignore strong state
trends 127 and strong Supreme Court language encouraging
adoption of state trends, 128 it is unlikely that these courts ignored
precedent, but rather gave different weight to state policies given
the factual circumstances of the cases.
3.

HCQIA

The Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins courts did not violate the
framework of the HCQIA. The HCQIA was enacted after Shadur,
29
thus the language of the HCQIA did not bind the Shadur court.'
However, both the Virmani and Adkins courts were bound by the
HCQIA.130

The Virmani court addressed the HCQIA stating, "we should
not recognize a privilege where it appears that Congress
considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided

frustrate the purposes of the state legislation that was enacted to foster these
confidential communications." Id. at 13.
125. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291; Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1330. Both courts
concluded that state legislatures did not consider the impact on discrimination
cases. Id. Instead, the courts noted that the focus was to reduce access to
peer-reviewed information during defamation and medical malpractice
actions. Id.
126. Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1062; Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291; Adkins, 488 F.3d
at 1329. It is unlikely that an action would arise from a psychotherapistpatient relationship that is not an independent claim. In fact, the claim in
Jaffee was an independent claim that did not arise out of the psychotherapistpatient relationship, but rather a third party wanted to use the
psychotherapist-patient communications in her action against the patient.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5.
127. The Shadur court acknowledged that they should not ignore strong
state trends. Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1061; see Virmani, 259 F.3d at 290; Adkins
488 F.3d at 1327 (acknowledging the prevalence of the peer-review privilege
throughout the United States).
128. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing Jaffee's language
regarding state privilege laws).
129. The HCQIA was enacted in 1986. Shadur was decided in 1981. The
HCQIA can be considered to have been a congressional reaction to the Shadur
decision because the HCQIA explicitly claims in section 11101(4): "The threat
of private money damages liability under Federal laws, including treble
damages liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages
physicians from participating in effective professional peer review." 42 U.S.C.
§ 11101(4).
130. Virmani was decided in 2001. Adkins was decided in 2007.
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the privilege itself."131 The court concluded that while Congress
did not reject a privilege for medical peer-review materials
outright, it did weigh the benefits of protecting peer-reviewed
materials against "allowing putative victims of discrimination to
pursue their claims-and (Congress] decided to give greater
weight to the latter."'132 Furthermore, the Virmani court identified
that even if Congress did intend the HCQIA to grant protections to
peer-review materials, it did not intend on protections of such
133
materials if they violate civil rights laws.
In Adkins, the defendants sought HCQIA immunity and
argued that it extended to the peer-reviewed materials. 34 The
Adkins court did not directly address the HCQIA in its decision.
But the parties discussed the HCQIA in their briefs to the
Court. 35 The plaintiff noted that the HCQIA does not bar access
to peer-reviewed materials because the party opposing the
assertion of immunity must be able to have access to the peerreviewed information in order to rebut the presumption that the
peer-review action met the standards required by the HCQIA.136
Secondly, the plaintiff asserted that the HCQIA qualified
immunity does not extend to civil rights actions. 137 The amicus

131. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291.
132. Id. at 291-92; see 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1)(D) (disclaiming that immunity
from liability does not apply to actions concerning the civil rights of any
person(s)).
133. Id. at 292. The defendant in Virmani argued that there was a
Congressional intent to protect medical peer-review materials because the
main sponsor of the HCQIA intended on restricting the admission of peerreview evidence used in disciplinary proceedings. Id. The Virmani court
acknowledged that while the intent may have been there to protect peerreview materials, there was no intent to extend such protection to "actions
that violate civil rights laws." Id.
134. See Amicus Brief for Defendant/Appellees, supra note 10, at 5; Amicus
Brief for Appellant at 48, Adkins v. Christie, 488 F. 3d 1324 (11th Cir.
2007)(06-13107-G) (discussing the defendants' HCQIA defense asserting
qualified immunity under § 11111(a)).
135. Id.
136. See id. at 49. The plaintiff asserted that "[bly law, any peer review
action is automatically presumed to have met..." the requirements under
§ 11112(a) of the HCQIA, "[blut the presumption is rebuttable by a
preponderance of evidence." Id. Section 11112(a) requires the following for
HCQIA qualified immunity to apply:
"[A] professional review action must be taken - 1) in the reasonable
belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health care,
2)after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter, 3)after
adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician
involved ...4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by
the facts known after [a] reasonable effort to obtain the facts."
42 U.S.C. § 11112(a). The plaintiff asserted that without access to the
information, the presumption cannot be rebutted. Brief for Appellant, supra
note 134, at 49.
137. Id. at 50; see 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1)(D) (creating an exception to the
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brief in support of the defendants employed the HCQIA to
persuade the Adkins court to reject Virmani, arguing that Virmani
"misconstrued key provisions of the [HCQIA]."13
Despite these
arguments, the Adkins court relied on Virmani in its reasoning
without mention of the HCQIA.139 In adopting Virmani, and
absent any reasoning to suggest the contrary, the Adkins decision
was not contrary to the HCQIA.140
B. Slamming the Door Shut: The Impacts on Litigation
Surrounding the Peer-Review Process
Proponents of the privilege fear that the trend started by the
Seventh, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits may have greater
implications on litigation surrounding the peer-review process and
141
the effectiveness of the peer-review process itself.

HCQIA immunities for civil rights claims); see also discussion supra note 134
(discussing the Virmani court's rejection that the HCQIA applied to civil
rights cases).
138. Amicus Brief for Defendant/Appellees, supra note 10, at 16. The brief
did not explain why Virmani misconstrued the HCQIA, nor did the brief cite to
any specific provisions of the HCQIA that were misconstrued.
139. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1330.
140. Both Adkins and Virmani applied federal law to discrimination claims
brought by physicians subject to peer-review. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1326-27;
Virmani, 259 F.3d at 285. There was no argument in the defendant's brief nor
the amicus brief in support of the defendant as whether/why the Virmani
court did not appropriately apply the HCQIA. See discussion supra note 138
(noting that the amicus brief in support of the defendants did not discuss why
Virmani misapplied the HCQIA). Absent any further information and Adkins'
heavy reliance on Virmani, the Adkins court did not appear to go outside the
boundaries of the HCQIA.
141. See Palmer, supra note 17 (discussing concerns after the Adkins
decision that the peer-review privilege will not be recognized in federal
decisions to claims outside of discrimination, and also fears that such a
decision would reduce physician candidness in the peer-review process
because of litigation fears); Salamon, supra note 97, at 673 (concluding that
the physician participants in medical peer-review will have to forecast
whether claims against them may be brought in federal or state court and may
be stripped of a privilege that they relied upon); Ronald G. Spaeth, Kelley C.
Pickering & Shannon M. Webb, Quality Assurance and Hospital Structure:
How the Physician-Hospital Relationship Affects Quality Measures, 12 ANN.
HEALTH L. 235, 243-44 (2003) (noting that disclosing peer-review information
may lead to greater access to the peer-reviewed materials by medical
malpractice plaintiffs thus creating a "resurgence" of medical malpractice
actions); Bryan Liang & Steven Small, Communicating About Care:
Addressing Federal-State Issues in Peer Review and Mediation to Promote
Patient Safety, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 219, 236 (2003) (discussing that
individuals may circumvent state peer-review protections by joining a federal
claim to a personal injury lawsuit).
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Impact on Litigation

One primary fear is that nonrecognition of the privilege will
result in peer-reviewed information being used in medical
malpractice litigation.1 42 The Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins courts
characterized the underlying claims in a way that federal
nonrecognition of the medical peer-review privilege will not likely
increase medical malpractice litigation. 143 All three courts made
the distinction that the underlying action was based on the peerreview process itself and not just an independent claim utilizing
Medical malpractice lawsuits are
peer-review information.144
based on the alleged breach of duty of care by a physician to a
patient resulting in harm to the patient,1 45 thus peer-reviewed
information would only be tangential to the underlying action and
not a foundation for it. 146
In subsequent cases, if the peer-review privilege is evaluated
through the lens of the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins courts, then
no medical malpractice litigant can have access to peer-review
material. However, if access to peer-review information is
interpreted broadly (meaning no restrictions on access), then many
litigants in medical malpractice claims against federally funded or
federally run hospitals (and its physicians) could potentially have

142. See Spaeth, supra note 141, at 245 (discussing that the plaintiffs right
to broader discovery of peer-review materials may attach the negative
consequences of medical malpractice litigation, such as higher insurance
premiums for physicians as well as consumers, and decreased quality and
access for consumers to healthcare).
143. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1329; Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1062; Virmani, 259 F.3d
at 290.
144. The Shadur court determined that the purpose of the state peer-review
privilege was premised on preventing peer-review materials to be used against
physicians in independent causes of action such as medical malpractice
lawsuits. Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1062. Nonetheless, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs underlying claim was premised on the peer-review process itself.
Id. The Virmani court noted that in a discrimination case, the "[p)laintiffs
claim arises out of the peer review proceedings, [whereas] a plaintiffs claim in
a medical malpractice case arises from actions that occurred independently of
the review proceedings." Virmani, 259 F.3d at 290. The Adkins court
concluded that the peer-review materials were "[tlhe only way that Adkins can
demonstrate the existence of disparate treatment." Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1329.
In Adkins, the plaintiffs claim was directly related to the peer-review process,
whereas a medical malpractice lawsuit would not be premised on the peerreview process. Id. at 1329. The Adkins Court noted that recognizing a
privilege under the factual circumstances of the case would potentially bar the
plaintiff from bringing his case, whereas the same would not hold true in a
medical malpractice action. Id.
145. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 185
(2007) (defining medical malpractice litigation).
146. See discussion supra note 144 (discussing independent claims not based
on the peer-review process versus claims resulting from the peer-review
process).
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access to the information. 147
Proponents of the privilege also fear that federal claims will
be joined to state personal injury claims so as to circumvent state
peer-review privileges.1 48 However, such a scenario is not likely to
occur. It is doubtful that federal courts will be able to assert
supplemental jurisdiction over a state personal injury lawsuit
because the state claim likely will not be "so related to claims in
the [federal] action... that they form part of the same case or
controversy."1 49 Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction
will also be bound by state law because of Rule 501's requirements
that state privilege laws apply where there is "an element of a
claim or defense" founded in state law. 150
Finally, Shadur,
Virmani, and Adkins identified that the claims arose out of the
peer-review process and not an independent action, which
indicates that there will be privileges against personal injury
151
lawsuits in federal courts.
If courts narrowly adhere to the framework established by the
Seventh, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts, then it is likely
that there will not be a large impact on litigation involving peerreview materials. 52 However, if courts interpret the Shadur,
Virmani, and Adkins decisions broadly, 15 3 then there may be
detrimental impacts resulting in more litigation around peerreviewed materials.

147. A broad interpretation would result in unrestricted access because the
decisions of the Seventh, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that the medical
peer-review privilege does not apply in federal courts.
148. See Liang, supra note 141, at 236 (noting that a federal claim can be
added to a claim of "patient injury" so as to avoid state privilege standards).
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) (noting that in a civil action where
federal courts have original jurisdiction, a state claim must be so related to the
federal claim that they form the same case or controversy).
150. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (requiring application of state privilege laws
where an element of a claim or defense is founded in state law).
151. See discussion, supra note 145 (noting the courts' separation of actions
premised on the peer-review process and actions (i.e. personal injury claims)
based on independent circumstances).
152. A large impact on litigation will not be felt because the circuit courts
indicated that there would not be a probative necessity for scenarios that are
not premised in the peer-review process and/or necessary to maintain the
plaintiffs claim. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1329; Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1062;
Virmani, 259 F.3d at 290. This limits nonrecognition of the privilege to
narrow fact patterns, such as discrimination claims. Furthermore, the
Virmani and Adkins courts stressed the probative value of the materials
because the claim was alleging discrimination by the peer-review process.
Virmani, 259 F.3d at 293; Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1330. A narrow reading of
these holdings would limit nonrecognition to only discrimination claims.
153. A broad interpretation would mean that there is no medical peer-review
privilege in federal courts in all circumstances.
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Impact on Peer-Review Process

Courts declining to recognize the peer-review privilege invoke
fears that the purpose and effectiveness of the peer-review process
will be negatively impacted. 54 Depending on how courts interpret
the Adkins, Shadur, and Virmani decisions, there may be a

Conversely, the
detrimental impact to physician candidness.
potential for disclosure will serve as a check on possible peerreview. Furthermore, there are safeguards to indicate that
physician candidness may not be all that effected by the outcome
of these cases.
If courts interpret the three circuit court decisions narrowly,
then there are protections in place for physicians participating in
the peer-review process. 155 A narrow interpretation would indicate
that non-recognition of the privilege applies to situations where
the action arises from the peer-review process. 156 This prevents
physicians being subject to actions outside the peer-review process,
such as medical malpractice or defamation lawsuits, thus mending
some fears of litigation as a result of participating in the
process. 157 A narrow interpretation may also allow for a safeguard
to ensure effective peer-review to root out discrimination. Where
reviewing physicians are on notice that they and the peer-review
materials may be subject to discrimination lawsuits, they may be
more scrupulous in their evaluations.
Conversely, a broad interpretation of the Shadur, Virmani,
58
and Adkins courts may have an impact on participation.1
Without limitations on the scenarios to which non-recognition of
the privilege would apply, physicians participating in, and/or being
evaluated through, a peer-review process may be subject to actions
159
independent from the peer-review process.
Finally, there are safeguards in place for litigation arising out
of the peer-review process indicating a minimal impact on the
First, a "physician
effectiveness of the peer-review process.
bringing an action against a peer review [committee] [may be]

154. See Salamon, supra note 97, at 673 (noting that Virmani establishes
situations where the 'privilege becomes all but illusory' to peer-review
participants).
155. See discussion, supra Part II.B.1. (detailing narrow versus broad
interpretations of the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins decisions).
156. See accompanying text supra note 154 (arguing that narrow
interpretation of the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins decisions would determine
that cases that are not premised in the peer-review process itself, such as
medical malpractice actions, do not have as strong of a probative value).
157. Assurance about the confidentiality of the process will arise because
physicians will not be potentially opening themselves or other physicians to
having peer-reviewed information used against them in independent actions.
158. See discussion, supra Part III.B.1 (discussing broad interpretations of
the Shadur, Virmani and Adkins decisions).
159. Id.
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deterred by the potential responsibility for paying the defendant's
legal fees under the [HCQIA];"160 therefore, a plaintiff should be
rather certain before bringing such an action. Second, "data shows
that physician-plaintiff[s] ha[ve] a near-zero chance of success" in
bringing actions against a peer-review committee. 161 Unless there
is a broad interpretation of the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins
decisions, these cases will likely not have a large impact on the
effectiveness of the peer-review process.
IV.

RESOLVING CONCERNS SURROUNDING THE FEDERAL

MEDICAL PEER-REVIEW PRIVILEGE

Despite many questions surrounding the peer-review process,
162
the overall impact on litigation will likely not be substantial.
However, uncertainty lies in circumstances where both federal and
state law apply.163 Shadur, Virmani, Adkins and Rule 501 do not
provide guidance on how to best deal with this concern.164 This
question can be addressed in three ways. First, Congress can
make legislative changes to clarify this problem by amending Rule
501 and adopting the Senate version of the Rule.
Second,
Congress can pass legislation recognizing the medical peer-review
privilege and defining its boundaries. Third, courts can work
within the framework established by the Shadur, Virmani, and
Adkins courts to favor disclosure in cases that arise out of the
peer-review process, while applying the privilege to cases that
arise independent of the peer-review process.
A. Neither Closed Nor Open: How the Direction of the Seventh,
Fourth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals
Does Not Adversely Affect the Peer-Review Process
The decisions of the Seventh, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals will likely not have a substantial impact on the
peer-review process or any litigation arising from the process. The
framework established by the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins courts
160. William P. Gunnar, The Scope of a Physician'sMedical Practice:Is the
Public Adequately Protected by State Medical Licensure, Peer Review, and the
NationalPractitionerData Bank?, 14 ANN. HEALTH L. 329, 357 (2005).
161. Id. The author cited studies that indicate a low rate of success for
physician-plaintiffs against peer-review committees. Id. at 353.
162. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the likelihood that Shadur,
Virmani, and Adkins will impact litigation surrounding the peer-review
process as well as the impact on the process itself). Though there is the
possibility that courts will interpret these decisions broadly, the framework of
the cases do not give such an indication.
163. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (analyzing the House and Senate
Judiciary Committee notes on potential issues that may arise where both
federal and state law governs).
164. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (noting that neither the rule nor case
law give sufficient guidance on this concern).
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does not permit too broad or too narrow of interpretations on the
medical peer-review privilege's application in federal courts.
Furthermore, the safeguards in place concerning litigation arising
the likelihood of adverse
out of the peer-review process reduce
165
impacts on the peer-review process.
While it is possible for federal courts to interpret Shadur,
Virmani, and Adkins to mean that there is no federal medical-peer
review privilege, the cases themselves do not exclude recognizing
All three cases
the privilege in certain circumstances.
166
Yet,
acknowledge the reasoning behind state peer-review laws.
all three courts distinguish the facts of the cases from fitting
within the frame of state peer-review laws, and 167declined to use
state peer-review laws in reaching their decisions.
Each of these decisions specifically noted that the plaintiffs'
claims arose out of the medical peer-review proceedings, and
indicated that this factor was a heavy consideration for disclosure
of the peer-review information. 168 It would be a far stretch for a
165. See discussion supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the safeguards established
to prevent abuse of nonrecognition of the privilege in federal courts).
166. Shadur, 644 F.2d at 1062. The Shadur court noted that the purpose
behind the Illinois Medical Studies Act (the applicable state peer-review law)
"is 'to bolster the effectiveness of in-hospital peer group review"' through open
and candid communication. Id. The court noted that the reasoning behind
state medical peer-review laws arises from fears that disclosure of peer-review
participants and materials in litigation, specifically medical malpractice
litigation, will reduce the effectiveness of the peer-review process. Id.;
Virmani, 259 F.3d at 290. Virmani cited the Georgia Supreme Court in
identifying the purpose of state peer-review laws. Id. The court noted it was a
"proper legislative choice between the competing public concerns of fostering
medical staff candor, on the one hand, and impairing medical malpractice
plaintiffs' access to evidence, on the other hand." Id. The Adkins court
acknowledged that health care providers have a "legitimate interest in
keeping peer review documents confidential and in protecting them from
widespread dissemination." Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1329.
167. Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1062. The Shadur court stated that this was not a
medical malpractice lawsuit, and was in fact a situation where the plaintiffs
suit arose out of the medical peer-review process. Id. The court specified that
absent disclosure of the peer-review proceedings the plaintiff might not have
had enough evidence to establish his case. Id. at 1062-63. The court declined
to recognize the privilege observing, "[t]he public interest in private
enforcement of federal antitrust law in this context is simply too strong to
permit the exclusion of relevant and possibly crucial evidence." Id. at 1063.
Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291. The Virmani court stated, "There is no evidence
that state legislatures considered the potential impact on discrimination cases
of a privilege for medical peer review proceedings." Id. The court then
declined to have the state law influence its decision. Id. The Adkins court
agreed stating, "[t]he interests at issue in a discrimination claim ... are
different from that of a malpractice case, and merit a different analysis."
Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1330. The Adkins court then declined to use the state
peer-review law in coming to its decision. Id.
168. See id. and accompanying text (detailing why the Shadur, Virmani,
and Adkins courts declined to apply the state privilege law).

The John Marshall Law Review

[42:561

court to interpret these cases broadly to mean that there is no
circumstance where the medical peer-review privilege would apply
in federal court. First, Rule 501 does not permit for such an
interpretation to occur. Rule 501 requires that if a state provides
the rule of decision, then the federal court must apply the state
law in determining privileges.169
In cases such as medical
malpractice and defamation actions, which do not arise out of the
peer-review process, the applicable state law will govern, thus
requiring the federal courts to apply state privilege laws. Second,
courts interpreting these cases broadly will be ignoring the
reasoning behind the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins decisions.
Each of these cases heavily weighed the fact that the plaintiffs'
claims arose out of the peer-review process, 170 and a broad
interpretation flatly rejecting the privilege in federal courts would
go against the weight of that reasoning.
Additionally, a very narrow interpretation of these cases
likely would not produce adverse impacts on the peer-review
process. Under such an interpretation, courts would only disclose
peer-reviewed information in cases involving discrimination
arising out of peer-review process. While this is more consistent
with the decisions of Virmani and Adkins as opposed to a very
broad interpretation,171 it does not include the facts and reasoning
of Shadur, which was cited by both the Adkins and Virmani
courts.1 72 The claim in Shadur was an antitrust lawsuit without
reference to discrimination. 173 While the HCQIA may protect
individuals participating in peer-review,1 74 it does not go so far as
to prevent plaintiffs from bringing such claims nor does it prevent
discovery of such information. 175 Therefore, Shadur cannot be
ignored, and a narrow interpretation limited to disclosure only in
discrimination cases is unlikely.

169. FED. R. EVID. 501. The rule states in pertinent part, "[Iln civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law." Id.
170. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the emphasis the
Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins courts placed on the fact that the plaintiffs'
claims arose out of the peer-review proceedings).
171. This is more consistent than a broad interpretation of Virmani and
Adkins because both of these cases gave great weight to the fact that the
policy considerations of eliminating discrimination far outweighs the policy
considerations put forth by states of shielding peer-review information.
Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291; Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1330.
172. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 290-91; Adkins 488 F.3d at 1329.
173. Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a).
175. See Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291-92 (concluding that the HCQIA does not
create a medical peer-review privilege).
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Finally, safeguards established to decrease the likelihood of
plaintiffs' success in bringing actions against peer-review
committees gives further weight to the argument that the peerreview process will not be adversely affected by the Shadur,
The requirement under the
Virmani, and Adkins decisions.
HCQIA leaving open the potential for plaintiffs having to pay the
defendants' legal fees in failed claims, 176 coupled with a "near zero"
success rate of plaintiffs bringing actions against peer-review
committees, 177 ensures that plaintiffs who do choose to bring
actions against peer-review committees in federal courts, will be
careful in the claims they bring.
B. Leaving A Crack: Proposal to Preserve the Balance of
MaintainingState Privilege Protections
While Recognizing FederalPolicy
ConsiderationsIn Favor of Disclosure
While the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins decisions themselves
may not have a substantial impact on the peer-review process,
there is still a question of what federal courts should do in
situations where both state and federal law govern. 178 This issue
did not arise in Shadur, Virmani, or Adkins because all three
cases were clearly governed by federal law. 179 Three possible
solutions to this problem are for Congress to modify Rule 501
adopting the Senate version of the rule, to pass legislation
recognizing a federal medical peer-review privilege, or for the
courts to apply the reasoning of Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins in
holding disclosure of peer-reviewed information can occur only in
cases that arise from the peer-review process.

176. 42 U.S.C. § 11113. The statute states that in any lawsuit brought
against a defendant who was engaged in peer-review, and who met the
standards set forth by other provisions of the HCQIA,
[If] the defendant substantially prevails, the court shall, at the
conclusion of the action, award to a substantially prevailing party
defending against any such claim the cost of the suit attributable to
such claim, including a reasonable attorney's fee, if the claim, or the
claimant's conduct during the litigation of the claim, was frivolous,
unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith.
Id.
177. See discussion supra Part III.B.2 (delineating the potential safeguards
in place to prevent the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins decisions from adversely
affecting the peer-review process).
178. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (evaluating the concern of both federal
and state law governing and noting that the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins
decisions do not give sufficient guidance on this point).
179. See supra note 105 and accompanying text, (identifying the plaintiffs'
federal claims in all three cases).
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1. Legislative Solutions
When drafting the text of Rule 501, the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees disagreed on how the Rule should be
written.18 0 Each had different concerns on how the rule would
manifest itself.18 ' Ultimately the House version of Rule 501 was
adopted. 8 2 However, the Senate's concerns about the adopted
version of the Rule are the very concerns that arise in light of the
Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins decisions.
The Senate proposed a different variation of Rule 501 that
resolved their apprehension about the difficulties that may arise
in determining and defining what is an element of a claim or
defense and what to do in situations where both federal and state
law govern. 8 3 The Senate Judiciary Committee proposed the
following:
[I]n criminal and Federal question civil cases, federally evolved
rules on privilege should apply since it is Federal policy which is
being enforced ... in diversity cases where the litigation in question
turns on a substantive question of State law... it is clear that State
rules of privilege should apply unless the proof is directed at a claim
or defense for which Federal law supplies the rule of decision ...

If

the rule proposed here results in two conflicting bodies of privilege
law applying to the same piece of evidence in the same case, it is
contemplated that the rule favoring reception of the evidence
should be applied.184
While the Senate's version of the Bill is flawed in the same
manner as the current Rule 501,' s 5 it does pose fewer problems
than the current version of the rule. The adopted version allows
for more situations where both federal and state law can apply in
180. H.R. REP. No. 93-650; S. REP. No. 93-1277.
181. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (outlining the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees' various concerns, such as forum shopping and issues
where both federal and state laws govern).
182. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597 (1975). The notes of the Conference Committee

state, "The Conference adopts the House provision." Id.
183. S. REP. No. 93-1277. See discussion, supra Part III.A.1 (addressing the
Senate's concerns in greater detail).
184. S. REP. No. 93-1277. The formal wording of the civil action portion of

Rule 501 proposed by the Senate is as follows:
In civil actions and proceedings arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or 28
U.S.C. § 1335, or between citizens of different States and removed under
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) the privilege of a witness, person, government, State
or political subdivision thereof is determined in accordance with State
law, unless with respect to the particular claim or defense, Federal law
supplies the rule of decision.
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597. The Senate Judiciary Committee also noted, "the
Federal law of privileges should be applied with respect to pendant State law
claims when they arise in a Federal question case." S. REP. No. 93-1277.
185. This proposed rule is flawed in the sense that it does not find a solution
to circumstances where both federal and state law prevails.
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a single case. The current version of Rule 501 requires that state
law provide the privilege rule where an "element of a claim or
defense" is governed by state law.18 6 Absent clearer boundaries
defining the types of claims and when state law would govern,
15 7
difficulties may arise where federal law incorporates state law
or with questions such as those created by the Shadur, Virmani,
and Adkins decisions about how courts should apply potential
questions where both state and federal law govern.
The Senate proposal defines these boundaries more clearly. It
allows for federal privilege laws to apply where there is a federal
question, even where the federal courts are applying pendent
jurisdiction to ancillary issues,188 and where state law applies in
diversity situations.18 9 While the variation of the rule is slight, the
Senate's version of the rule would ultimately provide guidance on
how to manage cases where both federal and state law governs.
All cases arising out of federal law, such as the claims in Shadur,
Virmani, and Adkins,190 would not be subject to state privilege
standards. Most diversity cases would be subject to state privilege
cases. However, this proposal leaves unanswered questions of
what the impact will be on cases where the claim arises out of the
peer-review process, 191 and also how plaintiffs may be able to work
around the rule to be able to bring their cases in federal court and
still have access to such information.192 While the Senate version
of Rule 501 presents more defined boundaries than that of the

186. FED. R. EVID. 501.
187. See Paul Rothstein, The ProposedAmendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 139, n.73 (1973) (analyzing the problem that is
created where federal law incorporates state law and the Rule allows for both
federal and state law to govern).
188. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing the Senate's
proposal on pendent jurisdiction).
189. S. REP. No. 93-1277. The only exception the Senate carved out was in
diversity cases, where federal privilege law would apply if, for some reason,
federal law would apply the rule of decision. Id. However, the Senate
Judiciary Committee even indicated in the notes that this circumstance would
rarely if ever arise. Id. They did indicate, however, that if the situation did
arise, the rule favoring the reception of the evidence should apply. Id.
190. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (specifying the plaintiffs'
claims in the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins decisions).
191. There maybe diversity cases where the alleged conduct arises out of the
peer-review process. The Senate's proposed variation on the rule would have
potentially damaging implications for plaintiffs within those cases, such as
closing the opportunity for many to bring forward a case where they have been
wronged by the peer-review process.
192. While this may be tenuous, creative plaintiffs may find a way to opt for
federal claims in order to get access to such information in federal courts,
where they may not have access in state courts. This conflicts with the
concern about forum shopping that both the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees had when enacting Rule 501. H. REP. No. 93-650; S. REP. No. 931277.
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current version, this solution still does not completely address the
questions created by the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins decisions.
Another potential legislative solution could be for Congress,
like all fifty states as well as the District of Columbia have done,
to pass legislation adopting the medical peer-review privilege and
draw boundaries and exceptions for the privilege. However, such
an action could fall into the same problem that was acknowledged
by the Virmani and Adkins courts, where Congress would overlook
the potential impact of its legislation on certain types of cases.
Furthermore, such legislation does not allow for courts to have
flexibility in assessing circumstances on a case-to-case basis.
Conversely, congressional legislation on the privilege would
ensure the effectiveness of the peer-review process. However, the
great potential for Congress overlooking an important type of
situation or case, and the definiteness of legislation preventing
court flexibility, does not render congressional recognition off the
privilege a feasible solution.
2.

Court Solutions

Although revision of Rule 501 or congressional legislation
defining the boundaries of the privilege are both options to be
considered, the more likely and realistic solution to the issue at
hand will be for federal courts to interpret the Shadur, Virmani,
and Adkins decisions to apply nonrecognition of the peer-review
privilege only to situations where the plaintiffs' claim arises out of
the peer-review process. This is the best solution to strike a
balance between policy considerations for recognizing the privilege
and disclosing the peer-review information.
While this proposal may still subject those individuals
participating in the peer-review process to litigation, such
litigation would arise only out of the peer-review process. This
proposition, in turn, will allow for more effective peer-review
because physicians engaged in the process will not attempt to
abuse the process for discriminatory or anti-competitive purposes
if they know that they may be subject to litigation.
This approach, as compared to a broad interpretation of the
Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins decisions, will prevent plaintiffs
who do not have claims arising out of the peer-review process from
seeking their claims in federal court so as to get access to peerreviewed materials. This proposal is preferable over the narrow
reading of the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins decisions because
those that were wronged in the peer-review process outside of
discrimination will still be able to support their claims through
discovery of the peer-reviewed materials. Finally, this approach is
the best solution because it fits within the framework and
reasoning established by the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins
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courts. 193
V.

CONCLUSION

The growing number of federal courts that do not recognize a
medical peer-review privilege has resulted in questions as to how
far the privilege extends. The HCQIA, Rule 501, and Supreme
Court precedent have not answered looming concerns about how to
balance the decisions of the Seventh, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals with the need to maintain effective peer-review
processes and control litigation surrounding the process. No
federal appellate court or the Supreme Court has gone so far as to
assert that nonrecognition of the privilege ends only at
discrimination claims, nor have courts concluded that peerreviewed materials are accessible in every federal claim. Either
alteration and clarification of Rule 501, or specific guidelines for
courts will help detract fears of negative policy implications, as
well as protect the quality and privacy of the peer-review process.

193. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (identifying the purpose and
reasoning behind the Shadur, Virmani, and Adkins decisions).

